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I.   INTRODUCTION 
For many Americans, voting is merely a civic duty.  For others, it is a 
privilege won by decades of activism. For still others, it is an opportunity to sound 
their voices in the spirit of democracy. Yet, for all the passion that the vote 
generates, the intricacies of its processes are unfamiliar terrain to many 
Americans.  Congress uses apportionment and redistricting to shape the way 
American votes play out in politics.  Apportionment is the allocation of the 435 
United States House of Representatives seats among the states by population, 
while redistricting is the delineation of the state districts according to each state’s 
share of the 435 congressional seats.
1
  The process is simple enough in theory, but 
several factors make the practical application of these processes difficult.  The 
primary focus of this Article will be on the factors that have the potential to 
change the redistricting process, as well as the racial discrimination that can occur 
as a result of the current process.   
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”)2 is one of the most important 
factors affecting redistricting.  The VRA limits the manner in which legislatures 
may draw district lines so that districts do not splinter or dilute the minority vote.  
Since its enactment in 1965, Congress has amended the VRA four times, each 
time with the purpose of preventing racial discrimination in voting practices.
3
  
However, despite Congress’s tinkering, the VRA has not always lived up to its 
purpose in practice.  The language of the VRA remains ambiguous and subject to 
varying judicial interpretations.  In fact, various Supreme Court decisions have 
partly stripped away the VRA’s power to protect voting minorities by creating 
additional obstacles for minority plaintiffs to secure a remedy.  The most recent of 
                                                 
1
 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a)-(c) (2006). 
2 
 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(a)–(b) (2006); see infra Part II for an analysis of 
the VRA. 
3
 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1971, 1973-1973c, 1973f, 1973h-1973, 1973n-1973q, 1973aa-1973-1973bb1 (2006)). Congress 
amended the VRA in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(a)–(b) (2006).  
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these decisions is Bartlett v. Strickland,
4
 which has made it more difficult for 
affected minority plaintiffs to bring a claim or seek relief under the VRA.
5
 
The second obstacle for VRA plaintiffs is the 2010 Census.
6
  In 2010, the 
United States Census Bureau conducted its decennial population count, which 
determines the distribution of government funds, school district configuration, 
and most importantly, congressional districts for federal and state governments.
7
  
Although the 2010 Census continued to ask respondents to classify themselves by 
race, the Census Bureau determined that the short ten question form (“the short 
form”) was sufficient to glean the relevant information and discontinued the 
longer, more in-depth survey (“the long form”).8   
The Census also failed to question recipients’ citizenship or voting 
eligibility,
9
 questions which have an important impact on the redistricting process.  
Viewed in light of the Bartlett decision, the 2010 Census makes it more difficult 
for VRA plaintiffs to bring claims because the Census requires courts to rely on 
unpredictable and incomplete data in assessing VRA claims and their potential 
remedies.
10
 
This Article will address the current standard for plaintiffs bringing claims 
under the VRA, the Bartlett opinion and its reinterpretation of the VRA, and the 
effect that the 2010 Census will have on plaintiff’s claims under Section Two 
(“Section 2”) of the VRA.  This Article suggests that in light of the recent changes 
to Section 2, the time has come to articulate a more workable standard for 
                                                 
4 
Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009).   
5 
See infra Part III, Section A. 
6 
See infra Part III, Section B. 
7
 United States Census Bureau, An Introduction to the 2010 Census, available at 
http://2010.census.gov/partners/pdf/overview_dropin.pdf. 
8 
United States Census Bureau, The 2010 Census and the American Community Survey, available 
at http://2010.census.gov/partners/pdf/2010_acs_dropin.pdf.  The American Community Survey 
(“ACS”) is an annual survey of approximately 1 in 1,000 households.  See infra notes 100-04 and 
accompanying text. 
9
 See infra Part III, Section B.1 (the Census has never asked for an individual’s voting eligibility 
or citizenship status); see, e.g., infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
10
 See infra Part III, Section B.2.    
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plaintiffs bringing Section 2 claims.  Currently, state legislatures rely on Census 
data to reconfigure congressional districts.  The Census data provides legislatures 
with both a total population and a voting age population (“VAP”), which is then 
used to proportion districts based on the number of individuals living in them.   
This Article proposes that a more accurate method would be to utilize the 
citizen voting-eligible population (“CVEP”) to construct districts within states.11  
CVEP would exclude all those persons within the district who could not vote in 
elections such as non-citizens and disenfranchised felons.
12
  This method will 
benefit Section 2 plaintiffs in creating remedial districts under the VRA when 
legislatures must examine the minorities’ opportunity to elect representatives of 
choice.   
The substance of this Article will be divided into the following sections.  
Part II will provide a focused history of 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (the VRA), specifically, 
claims brought under Section 2 of the statute and their evolution since 1965.  Part 
III will discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in Bartlett v. Strickland, examine 
the role of the 2010 Census, and evaluate the impact both of these changes will 
have on Section 2 plaintiffs.  Part IV notes the lack of a clear redistricting 
standard and argues that allowing plaintiffs to use their chosen population 
methods at each phase of Section 2 litigation will both benefit Section 2 plaintiffs 
and provide a more accurate count of citizens within district lines.   
II.  THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 
A. A Brief History 
Although this Article will not focus on every section of the VRA, a brief 
discussion of the Act’s purpose and basic structure will help to clarify some of the 
problems currently afflicting the VRA’s application.  Congress passed the Voting 
Rights Act in 1965 with the purpose of enfranchising African-American voters 
after the 1957 and 1960 voting rights provisions and 1964 Civil Rights Acts failed 
                                                 
11
 This concept is an adaptation of Dr. Michael McDonald’s use of CVEP to provide a more 
accurate voter turnout percentage.  See generally Dr. Michael McDonald, United States Election 
Project, http://elections.gmu.edu/index.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2011). 
12
 See infra Part IV. 
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to provide a meaningful remedy.
13
  The VRA prohibits states, counties, and 
municipalities from abridging or denying the right to vote, in purpose or effect, 
because of race or color.
14
  Over the years, Congress has broadened the VRA to 
include protection for language minorities such as Asian Americans, Alaskan 
Natives, citizens of Spanish descent, and American Indians.
15
  The VRA contains 
both permanent sections and sections that will lapse if not renewed by Congress 
periodically.
16
  The section most relevant to this Article, Section 2, is a permanent 
provision of the VRA.
17
   
B.  Relevant Provisions of § 1973: Section 2 of the VRA 
Section 2 provides that no state or local government may enact a “voting 
qualification or prerequisite” which effectively denies or abridges any citizen’s 
right to vote because of their race, color, or language minority status.
18
  A 
violation of Section 2 in the VRA is established if, under the “totality of the 
circumstances,” those citizens protected under subsection (a) can show that they 
had “less opportunity than other members of the electorate” to exercise their 
                                                 
13
 See JOSEPH G. COOK & JOHN L. SOBIESKI, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS 18.02 at 18-4, (2011).  
Congress has the authority to implement voting regulations under Article I § 4 of the Constitution 
and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  Id. 
14
 Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 548–49 (1969). 
15
 See Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 at 402 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(e) 
(2006)). 
16 
See COOK & SOBIESKI, JR. supra note 13, at 18-5. For example, Congress must renew Section 4, 
which automatically covers all cities, counties, or states that implemented a voter qualification 
device and had a less than fifty percent of their voting population registered prior to November 1, 
1964.  Id. at 18-4.  Congress must also periodically renew Section 5 (“preclearance”), which 
requires those automatically covered voting districts to obtain the approval of the Attorney 
General before making any changes to their voting schemes.  Id. at 18-4, 18-5. The states covered 
under sections 4 and 5 are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South 
Carolina, Virginia, Texas, and counties or townships of California, Florida, New Hampshire, New 
York, North Carolina, Michigan, and South Dakota. 28 C.F.R. § pt. 51 app. (2006).  Sections 4 
and 5 were both renewed under the Fannie Lou Hammer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King 
Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006.  See Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 
Stat. 577 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).   
17
 See COOK & SOBIESKI, JR. supra note 13, at 18-5.     
18
 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006).  
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voting rights.
19
  In other words, the affected citizens must show that the voting 
practices diluted their voting strength.  Vote dilution usually occurs in one of two 
ways −−  legislatures either splinter the district and scatter minority voters 
throughout several districts to render their voting power inconsequential 
(“cracking”), or legislatures pack an excessive number of minority voters into a 
district to diminish their voting power in neighboring districts (“packing”).20  
Section 2 aims to prevent the dilution of minority voters by requiring states to 
draw districts allowing minorities the opportunity to elect candidates of their 
choice. It is not required, however, that the ability to elect be in proportion to the 
minority population in the district.
21
   
                                                 
19
 Id. §1973(b).  The full text of § 2 reads: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or 
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision 
in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any 
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in 
contravention of the guarantees set forth in section § 1973b(f)(2) of this 
title, as provided in subsection(b). 
 (b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of 
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination 
or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to 
participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) 
of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members 
of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected 
class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one 
circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this 
section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in 
numbers equal to their proportion in the population. 
Id. 
20
 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 n.11 (1986); see infra Part II, Section B.1.  
21
 See Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1014 n. 11 (1994) (“. . . [T]he ultimate right of § 2 is 
equality of opportunity, not a guarantee of electoral success for minority-preferred candidates of 
whatever race”).  
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In 1980, the Supreme Court interpreted Section 2 to require that plaintiffs 
show discriminatory intent in order to proceed with a claim under the VRA.
22
 
Congress responded by amending Section 2 in 1982 to explicitly remove the 
burden of proof requiring discriminatory intent.
23
  This amendment created the 
“results test,” wherein the focus of the inquiry is the actual result of the voting 
practice and not the motive behind it.
24
  The tension between the Court’s 
interpretation and Congress’ intent in enacting the VRA manifests itself in the last 
forty years of back-and-forth between the Court’s case law and Congress’ 
amendments, culminating in the current standard for a Section 2 claim. 
1. The Three-Prong “Gingles” Test 
In conjunction with the 1982 amendment, the Senate Committee 
promulgated a non-exclusive list of factors that courts may rely on when 
examining a Section 2 claim.
25
  However, it was not until 1986, when a challenge 
                                                 
22
 See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (“To prove such a purpose it is not 
enough to show that the group allegedly discriminated against has not elected representatives in 
proportion to its numbers.”).  
23 
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).     
24 
See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 63 (“It is the difference between the choices made by blacks and 
whites—not the reasons for that difference—that results in blacks having less opportunity than 
whites to elect their preferred representatives. Consequently, we conclude that under the “results 
test” of § 2, only the correlation between race of voter and selection of certain candidates, not the 
causes of the correlation, matters.”). 
25 
See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207 (listing 
seven factors courts may rely on in evaluating the validity of a § 2 claim):  
1) the history voting-related discrimination in the state or district; 2) the extent 
of racially polarized voting in that area; 3) the extent to which the state or 
political subdivision has used discriminatory procedures in the past; 4) the 
exclusion of minorities from the candidate slating process; 5) the extent to which 
minority group members bear the effects of discrimination make it difficult to 
participate in the political process; 6) the use “ racial appeals” in political 
campaigns; and 7) election of minority members in the past).  Two additional 
factors are persuasive in plaintiff’s evidence of vote dilution: Whether there is a 
“significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the 
particularized needs of the members of the minority group,” and “whether the 
policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting 
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under the amended Section 2 came before the Supreme Court, that the judiciary 
had its first opportunity to articulate a well-defined structure for Section 2 
claims.
26
  This structure has given some meaning to the ambiguity of Section 2.  
Under what is now known as the “Gingles test,” the Court laid out three 
preconditions that minority plaintiffs must satisfy before a minority group can 
proceed with a claim under Section 2.   
As a threshold inquiry, the minority group must demonstrate that it is 
“sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-
member district,”27 such that it would be practical to draw a district containing it 
(“Gingles I”).28  The group must also show its political cohesion, or, in other 
words, its propensity to vote for the same candidate (“Gingles II”).29  Lastly, the 
minority group must show that the majority group votes consistently in a bloc, 
enabling it to defeat the minority-preferred candidate absent special circumstances 
(Gingles III).
30
  The premise of this analysis is that in a district where majority 
and minority voters consistently prefer different candidates, the majority vote will 
dilute the minority vote, resulting in unequal voting opportunities.  Under the 
Gingles test, the Court will only proceed with the Section 2 analysis if a minority 
group can demonstrate all three preconditions.
31
  Plaintiffs can, however, usually 
                                                                                                                                     
qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is 
tenuous.”   
Id.  
26 
See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 34. 
27
 Id. at 50. A single-member district is that in which a “a single representative is elected by the 
voters within that geographic area to represent that area.” Steven J. Mulroy, The Way Out: A Legal 
Standard for Imposing Alternative Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Remedies, 33 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 333, 334 at n.5 (1998). This differs from a multi-member district, which elects more 
than one official per district.  Id. 
28 
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50.  
29
 Id. at 51. 
30 
Id.  
31 
Id. at 79.  Although Gingles only applied to at-large, multi-member districts, the Court has since 
extended this analysis to single-member districts also.  See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–41 
(1993).  Growe also seemed to assume the legitimacy of coalition suits, although the Court did not 
address the issue directly. Id. at 41 n.5. 
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establish liability by presenting illustrative districts in which it is possible to 
satisfy all three preconditions.
32
  
To establish liability under the first Gingles factor, in particular, minority 
group plaintiffs must present an illustrative district demonstrating that the 
minority group is “sufficiently large and geographically compact” to constitute a 
majority in the district.
33
  Without evidence that such potential ever existed, 
claims that the legislature has diluted their voting strength hold little merit.
34
  
Once satisfied of the government’s liability, the district court may then “exercise 
its traditional equitable powers to fashion the relief so that it completely remedies 
the prior dilution of minority voting strength and fully provides equal opportunity 
for minority citizens . . . to elect candidates of their choice.”35  As such, the kind 
of illustrative district on which the plaintiffs rely can be instrumental in the 
success or failure of their claim.   
2. The Totality of the Circumstances 
If a vote dilution claim satisfies the Gingles test, courts will then evaluate 
the claim using a “totality of the circumstances” analysis to determine whether 
legislatures have denied minorities equal access to the electoral process.
36
  
Pursuant to this test, the Supreme Court has instructed courts to use the seven 
factors dictated by the 1982 Senate Committee,
37
 past evidence of a state’s 
discrimination, the existence of racial tension, and any obstacles that may prevent 
minorities from voting or dilute their voting strength.
38
  As the Senate factors are 
not dispositive of vote dilution, plaintiffs are also free to present additional factors 
                                                 
32
 See Mulroy, supra note 27, at 364;  see also infra text accompanying notes 154–61.  
33 
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17.   
34
 Id.  
35
 S. REP. NO. 97-417 at 31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 208; see infra Part IV, 
Section A–B (arguing a broader population standard should be used for the liability phase, while a 
more narrow standard should be used at the remedy phase). 
36 
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).  
37
 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
38
 See id.  
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that demonstrate race-based vote dilution.
39
  Courts may also consider, for 
example, the ratio of minorities in the population of a district to the number of 
districts controlled by minorities, the ability of a minority to succeed in an 
election, as well as the state’s interest in maintaining the challenged electoral 
plan.
40
  The satisfaction of the three Gingles factors and demonstration of vote 
dilution under the totality of the circumstances inquiry establishes a plaintiff’s 
prima facie case. Establishing such case, however, after the Bartlett decision is far 
more difficult than it appears. 
III. CHANGING THE FACE OF SECTION 2 CLAIMS 
A.  Bartlett v. Strickland 
In 2009, the Supreme Court’s narrow 5-4 plurality opinion in Bartlett v. 
Strickland effectively changed the parameters of the Gingles test.
41
  More 
specifically, Bartlett further expounded on the interpretation of Gingles I: whether 
the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a 
majority in the district.
42
  In Bartlett, North Carolina’s assignment of several 
districts violated the state constitution’s “whole county” provision, which bans the 
splitting of counties when drawing legislative districts.
43
  The split counties, in 
turn, sued Dwight Strickland, the Director of the State Board of Elections, among 
others.  In a unique turn of events, the defendants responded by invoking Section 
Two of the VRA as a defense, claiming that splitting the counties prevented 
dilution of the black voting population.
44
  To succeed with this defense, the 
                                                 
39
 Rodriguez v. Pataki, 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 372–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d, 543 U.S. 997 (2004).   
40
 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 426 (2006); see also JUSTIN 
LEVITT WITH BETHANY FOSTER, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO 
REDISTRICTING 45 (2008), http://brennan.3cdn.net/58180b7e66ce3d66bb_5sm6bvr97.pdf 
(discussing a summary of the factors courts examine in a vote-dilution claim). 
41
 Bartlett, 556 U.S. 1. 
42
 Id. at 12. 
43 
Id. at 8. 
44
 Id.  Usually minorities invoke Section 2 as the basis for their claim. The African American 
voting-age population had fallen below 50% making it impossible for the legislature to draw a 
geographically compact majority-minority district.  Id.  In splitting Pender County, the African 
American voting-age population was 39.36% but if left whole, the African American voting-age 
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election board and its official had to demonstrate that not splitting the counties 
would result in a Section 2 violation.
45
   
The trial court found that the African-American plantiffs satisfied all three 
Gingles preconditions, reasoning the minority group was sufficiently large and 
geographically compact when viewed with the support they could receive from 
“crossover” majority voters.46 The Supreme Court of North Carolina, however, 
disagreed with this analysis.
47
  On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
reversed, concluding that Section 2 of the VRA required that a minority group 
must comprise fifty percent of the voting-age population in a district before the 
minority group can raise a vote dilution claim.
48
  Under this ruling, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court ordered the Pender County district redrawn because there 
had been no violation of Section 2.
49
 
In its plurality opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States focused on 
the trial court’s deliberation over the first Gingles factor — specifically, how the 
Court should interpret what qualifies a group as sufficiently large and 
geographically compact?  Bartlett marks the first case in which the Supreme 
Court addressed the minimum size of minority groups necessary to satisfy the first 
Gingles requirement.
50
   
To begin its analysis of this question, the Court looked to the remedial 
minority districts created under Section 2 in prior cases.  Only by determining 
which remedies plaintiffs have been allowed in the past could the Court determine 
                                                                                                                                     
population would have been only 35.33%.  Id.; see also Pender Cnty v. Bartlett, 649 S.E.2d 364, 
366 (2007). 
45
 Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 8.  
46
 In this case, crossover majority voters are created when minority voters persuade some members 
of the majority to cross over and join their voting practices for a particular candidate.  See id. at 9-
14. 
47 
Id. at 9. 
48
 Id.   
49 
Id. 
50
 Id. at 9.  
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whether a minority under fifty percent could satisfy Section 2.
51
  The most 
common remedy for vote dilution is a majority-minority district in which the 
minority group makes up a “working majority” of the voting-age population in a 
district.
52
  Under a majority-minority district, the minority group has an almost 
undisputed ability to elect its preferred candidate.
53
  In contrast, Section Two does 
not require the implementation of “influence districts” in which the minority 
groups merely influence the election outcome in the district but may not be able to 
secure the election of their preferred candidate.
54
  The Court explained that the 
“crossover” or “coalitional” district, implicated in Bartlett, falls between the 
majority-minority district and an influence district.
55
  In a crossover district, 
minority groups do not comprise fifty percent of the district, but may still be large 
enough to elect a candidate of their choice with the help of majority voters who 
support the minority candidate.
56
  To decide whether such districts satisfied the 
first Gingles requirement, the Court had to resolve whether a crossover district 
could serve as a constitutional remedy under Section 2.
57
   
The Court found that crossover districts were not necessary under Section 
2 and in fact, would cause tension in the application of precedent.
58
  Furthermore, 
the Court opined that determining whether potential districts could operate as 
crossover districts would require too much guesswork and too many variables for 
courts to consider.
59
  The main thrust of the Court’s reasoning was that the VRA 
does not guarantee minority voters preference in the electoral arena, only the 
                                                 
51
 See supra text accompanying notes 38–40 (noting that the creation of an illustrative district is 
essential for Section 2 plaintiffs to show both vote dilution and that a remedy exists). 
52
 See, e.g.,Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 154 (1993).   
53
 Id. 
54 
See, e.g., Perry, 548 U.S. at 445 (2006) (stating minorities merely exerting an influence in the 
election is not enough to meet the threshold of “electing representatives of their choice”). 
55
 Bartlett, 556 U.S.  at 13; see e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 483 (2003).   
56
 Id.   
57 
Id. at 1243.  
58 
Id. at 1244. 
59 
Id. at 1244–45. 
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potential to exercise their voting rights.
60
  Although the Court recognized that the 
Gingles factors should not be applied mechanically, it favored the implementation 
of a bright-line fifty percent rule.
61
 In essence, under the Bartlett holding, a 
minority plaintiff will only satisfy all three Gingles factors if it comprises a 
legitimate majority of citizen voting-age population in the district (fifty-one 
percent or more); otherwise, Section 2 will not provide protection for those 
minority groups under the VRA. 
1.  What Does Bartlett Mean for the Future of Section 2 Claims? 
Although Bartlett provides courts with a bright-line rule, it also made it 
more difficult for Section 2 plaintiffs to bring claims.  Instead of allowing the 
examination of the minority bloc for sufficient size and cohesiveness, the plurality 
opinion forecloses claims from minorities in influence or crossover districts.  
Although legislatures may draw crossover districts on their own, minority 
plaintiffs will not have a claim under the VRA if those crossover districts dilute 
the minority vote. Moreover, states may no longer invoke Section 2 to justify their 
altruism in favorable district drawing.  The Bartlett holding states that minority 
voters who make up fifty percent or less of the voting-age population in a district 
do not have the requisite size to “elect representatives of their choice.”62   
The legislature’s ability to address minority vote dilution has been limited 
to circumstances in which the minority constitutes a majority of the district. As a 
result, state legislatures, like North Carolina’s, will have difficulty raising the 
VRA as preemptive remedy for minority vote dilution.
63
  The Bartlett holding 
seemingly encourages states to “pack” minority voters into districts in the interest 
                                                 
60
 See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1014 (1994) (“And the proviso also confirms what is 
otherwise clear from the text of the statute, namely, that the ultimate right of § 2 is equality of 
opportunity, not a guarantee of electoral success for minority-preferred candidates of whatever 
race”). 
61 
Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 19. 
62
 Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 19 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
63
 See Terry Smith, Disappearing Districts: Minority Vote Dilution Doctrine as Politics, 93 MINN. 
L. REV. 1680, 1681 (2009) (critiquing the North Carolina Supreme Court ruling by arguing that it 
is counter to the amended Section 2 because the ruling presents difficulties the 1982 amendment 
was meant to eradicate). 
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of reaching the fifty percent threshold, but with the unintended −−  or possibly 
intended −−  consequence of diluting their vote in other districts in the state.64  
Alternatively, legislatures can also dismantle districts with less than fifty percent 
minority voting-age populations without fear of Section 2 claims.  As a result, the 
Bartlett decision increases vote dilution, while simultaneously decreasing the 
availability of remedies under the VRA. 
2.  Criticism of the Bartlett Holding 
In light of Bartlett and the 2010 Census changes, the influence of Section 
2 for minority voters trying to bring claims under the VRA is murky.
65
  Bartlett’s 
greatest impact will be felt by the very minorities most often affected by vote 
dilution, African Americans and Hispanics.  Although a voting minority of thirty-
nine percent may be able to elect representatives by banding together with other 
minorities or whites in the district, the Bartlett plurality reasoned that such 
numbers alone are not enough to elect a preferred candidate.
66
  Instead, the Court 
determined that approving coalition districts would give voting minorities of less 
than fifty percent undue assistance in electing their candidates; a result that 
Section 2 does not warrant.
67
  This narrow ruling limits the districts that will be 
able to elect representatives of their choice.   
The Court overlooked several important factors in deciding Bartlett, most 
notably, the potency of the coalition district and the rarity of majority-minority 
districts. Requiring fifty percent or more minorities will diminish minorities’ 
ability to elect a representative of their choice with the help from crossover voters. 
In 2007, only twenty-one of the forty-two members of the Congressional Black 
Caucus were elected from a majority-minority district of fifty percent of greater.
68
 
                                                 
64
 Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 19.  
65
 See infra Part III, Section B. (discussing of the 2010 Census’ impact on the VRA and Section 2 
claims). 
66 
Id.   
67
 Id.  
68
 Smith, supra note 63, at 1685 (construing the 2007 U.S. Census Bureau, American Community 
Service 110th Congressional District Summary File “District by Race for Persons 18 Years or 
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It is increasingly difficult for minorities, such as African Americans, to achieve a 
fifty percent majority when they are faced with vast population dispersal and a 
disproportionate number of individuals under the voting age.
69
  Specifically, the 
2000 Census reported that 31.4 percent of African Americans were under the age 
of eighteen,
70
 compared to only 23.5 percent of Whites.
71
  Further, African 
Americans living in majority-black congressional districts currently experience 
the greatest population decreases.
72
  These two factors will make it much more 
difficult for African Americans to claim vote dilution under Section 2.
73
     
                                                                                                                                     
Older” to infer that the remaining 21 representatives were elected with crossover support).  This 
reliance on cross-over support is not a new phenomenon. See Carol M. Swain, The Future of Black 
Representation, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Sept. 21, 1995, at 1, available at 
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_future_of_black_representation (“Black 
Democrats Ronald Dellums, Alan Wheat, and Bill Clay and black Republicans Gary Franks and 
J.C. Watts have shown that white voters in congressional elections will support black 
candidates”). 
69 
See Smith, supra note 63, at 1685-86. (“Majority-black congressional districts were also among 
those losing the greatest overall population between 2000 and 2007. Of the twenty-five 
congressional districts experiencing the greatest population decreases during this period, nine are 
majority-black and thirteen are represented by blacks.”); see also Swing State Project, Population 
Change by Congressional District, Sept. 3, 2008, 
http://swingstateproject.com/showDiary.do;jsessionid=0B6B8CFBE4FDC8C8F577068F42D5FF3
F? diaryId=2952 (ranking the congressional districts with the greatest population losses between 
2000 and 2007).   
70 
U.S. Census Bureau, Black or African American Population, by Age and Sex for the United 
States: 2000, Feb. 25, 2002, http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs/phc-
t8/tables/tab03.pdf.   
71 
U.S. Census Bureau, White Population, by Age and Sex for the United States: 2000, Feb. 25, 
2002, http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs/phc-t8/tables/tab02.pdf 
72 
See Smith, supra note 63, at 1686.  This trend in population dispersal will likely increase after 
the 2010 Census reports. 
73
 This problem is not unique to the African American population.  Hispanic voters also face 
population dispersal.  See Roberto Suro and Sonya Tafoya, Dispersal and Concentration: Patterns 
of Latino Residential Settlement, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, Dec. 27, 2004, at 1, available at 
http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=36. The article provides: 
This Pew Hispanic Center report reveals that some 20 million Hispanics—57 
percent of the total—live in neighborhoods mostly populated by non-Hispanics. 
Rather than clustering in ethnic enclaves, these Latinos, including large shares 
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Moreover, the Bartlett holding seems to be contrary to the congressional 
intent behind enacting Section 2 of the VRA −−  allowing minority voting 
plaintiffs an opportunity to remedy vote dilution.  The plurality holding in Bartlett 
favored a fifty percent threshold because it represented the lowest percentage that 
still afforded minority voters the opportunity to elect representatives of their 
choice.
74
  However, the plain language of Section 2 gives no indication that 
Congress intended majority-minority districts to be the only available remedy to 
Section 2 plaintiffs or the only way to satisfy the first Gingles requirement.
75
  
Minority voter success in a district changes, and conditions may not be so clear-
cut as to justify a bright-line fifty percent rule.   
For example, historically, minority success in a district depended on 
crossover support even when the African-American citizen voting-age population 
constituted fifty-five percent.
76
  Indeed, the North Carolina Supreme Court has 
already recognized that districts with an African American population of only 
                                                                                                                                     
of the immigrant and low-income populations, are scattered in neighborhoods 
where on average only seven percent of the residents are Hispanics.  
In addition, Hispanic voters may appear to have a voting population higher that 
what actually exists due to non-voting immigrants being counted in the district 
totals.  
Id.; see U.S. Census Bureau, The Whole Story, 
http://www.census.gov/population/apportionment/about/faq.html#Q8 (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) 
(stating the Census has never differentiated between citizens and non-citizens). 
74
 Bartlett, 556 U.S, at 19 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
75 
Id. Moreover, Gingles made it clear that the reasoning behind the first prong was to provide the 
potential to elect representatives of minority choice, not to apply a mechanical standard.  See 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 n.17 (1986) (“[u]nless minority voters possess the potential 
to elect representatives in the absence of the challenged structure or practice, they cannot claim to 
have been injured by that structure or practice.”); Mulroy, supra note 28 at 365 (“[The Gingles] 
language suggests that the nature of the ‘challenged structure or practice’ controls. Where the 
plaintiffs do not challenge the use of at-large elections per se, but instead some discrete feature of 
the particular at-large system being used, a different analysis obtains”). 
76 
Id. at 1256 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting Rights Law Now at War 
With Itself? Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1527–28 
(2002)).  
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38.37 percent had the opportunity to elect representatives of their choice.
77
  The 
Bartlett plurality, however, concluded that there could be no clear-cut indication 
of what “magic number” percentage of minority voters is necessary.  In fact, it is 
possible, and even probable, that minority voters can still have the realistic 
potential to elect representatives of their choice without a numerical majority.
 78
  
Ultimately, the fifty percent threshold is arbitrary and limits the applicability of 
Section 2 as a remedy.
79
   
Courts should, instead, evaluate vote dilution claims on a statewide basis, 
rather than examining the violating district alone.
80
  Section 2 claims are supposed 
to examine a voting minorities’ ability to elect a representative by ensuring a 
“roughly proportionate” percentage to their population in the state.81  In other 
words, Gingles I requires courts to compare the statewide minority voting 
population to the number of districts in the state in which minority voters have the 
potential to elect a representative of their choice.  Thus, if the state has a minority 
voting age population of fifty percent, but only three of the ten districts allow 
minorities the potential to elect their chosen representative, the districts are not 
proportionate. The number of districts with the potential to elect should be 
roughly proportionate to the minority population of the state. 
Eliminating the availability of crossover districts as a remedy discounts 
two important judicial guidelines.  First, it undermines the congressionally-
dictated “results test,” which emphasizes a focus on the result of the proposed 
district when looking statewide for roughly proportional voting power.
82
  Second, 
it downplays the Court’s holding in Shaw v. Reno, which prohibits legislatures 
from relying on race as an exclusive factor during redistricting.
83
  Despite Shaw’s 
                                                 
77 
See Pender Cnty., 649 S.E.2d at 366–67 (2007) (“Past election results in North Carolina 
demonstrate that a legislative voting district with a total African-American population of at least 
41.54 percent, or an African-American voting age population of at least 38.37 percent, creates an 
opportunity to elect African-American candidates.”). 
78
 See infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.  
79
 See Pender Cnty, 649 S.E.2d at 377 (Parker, J., dissenting).  
80
 Bartlett, 556 U.S.  at 30 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
81
 Id. at 35 (Souter, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Gingles, 478 U.S. at 63 (1986).  
82 
Id. at 34 (Souter, J. dissenting). 
83
 Id. at 34 (Souter, J. dissenting). 
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constrictions, the VRA’s goal is still to allow minorities a fair opportunity to elect 
their chosen representatives.  This further complicates states’ attempts to create 
fair, reasonable, and constitutional districts. 
In the post-Bartlett era, states must now focus more singularly on race to 
create viable districts to meet the Section 2 majority-minority obligation
84
 and 
provide minority voters with roughly proportional electoral success.  For example, 
in North Carolina, African Americans constitute fifty percent or more of the 
voting-age population in only nine districts, whereas there are twelve districts 
with thirty-nine to forty-nine percent of African American voters.
85
  Under the 
Bartlett plurality’s approach to Section 2 claims, only the nine majority-minority 
districts are capable of electing representatives of their choice, while the other 
twelve are not large enough to bring Section 2 claims or elect their chosen 
candidates.  This unfortunate approach can reduce minority voting effectiveness 
by authorizing the creation of districts in which the minority comprises less than 
fifty percent of the population — sometimes as little as twenty percent—without 
legal consequences.  This quandary has created obstacles for both minority 
plaintiffs and states attempting to create fair electoral districts for minorities.  
Minority plaintiffs may not bring claims if they constitute less than fifty percent, 
and legislatures will, in turn, create as many majority-minority districts as 
possible, eradicating potential crossover districts in the process.
86
   
The Bartlett plurality placed a great deal of emphasis on the complications 
of predicting crossover districts and their success.
87
  In reality, it is not so difficult 
to calculate the success of a crossover district.  The success or failure of a 
crossover district depends on the correlation between minority population in a 
                                                 
84
 Id. at 41.  Legislatures may not rely on race as the primary factor in redistricting or 
reapportionment.  See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (“A reapportionment plan that 
includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely 
separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one 
another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid.”). 
85
 Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 42 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
86 
Id.  It is important to realize that crossover districts play an important role in unifying majority 
and minority voters.  By disallowing the use of crossover districts to satisfy Section 2 claims the 
plurality is eliminating a fair remedy as well as requiring states to rely on race in violation of Shaw 
v. Reno.  See id. at 33-34 (internal citation omitted).  
87
 Id. at 17.  
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district, minority voter turnout, minority cohesion, and the white bloc voting 
percentage in the district.
88
   
For instance, consider two hypothetical districts, each with a forty percent 
minority voting-age population. These districts may succeed or fail in an area 
depending on the aforementioned factors.
89
  Assume that in district one, minority 
voters have a lower voter turnout rate (30%) and lower voter cohesion (that is, the 
minority voters do not have a history of voting for the same candidate) than White 
voters in the same district (70%).  Also assume that district two has minority voter 
turnout equal to that of White voters and higher voter cohesion (90%).
90
  Under 
                                                 
88
 See Allan J. Lichtman & J. Gerald Hebert, A General Theory of Vote Dilution, 6 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 
10 (1993) (quoting “As the proportion of minority population in a district, the level of minority 
turnout, and the degree of minority cohesion increase, the levels of white bloc voting needed to 
defeat minority preferred candidates also increase”). 
89 
Id. at 11. 
90
 See Lichtman & Hebert, supra note 88, at 11 (1993).  The table shows the exact calculation as 
such: 
 
Projected Vote for Minority Candidate of Choice 
Two Hypothetical Districts 
District 1: Minority Voting 
Age Population = 40% 
  
(Minority Turnout = 30% and Anglo Turnout = 40%) 
Percent Minority Among Voters = 40x.30/(40x.30+60x.40) = 33% 
1. Minority Vote for 
Minority Candidate 
= .70 x 33% = 23.1% 
[FNa1]
 
2. Anglo Vote for Minority 
Candidate 
= .20 x 67% = 13.4% 
[FNaa1]
 
3. Total Vote for Minority 
Candidate 
= 23.1% + 
13.4% 
= 36.5% 
 
District 2: Minority Voting 
Age Population = 40% 
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these facts, the White bloc voters would be sufficient to defeat a minority-
preferred candidate in district one, but not in district two where minority voter 
cohesion is much higher in district one.
91
  Because crossover districts allow 
minorities amounting to a majority of the population a reasonable chance to elect 
representatives, these are consistent with the VRA, and therefore, would be an 
appropriate remedy for a VRA violation.
92
  Crossover districts, unlike influence 
districts, satisfy Congress’ intent that minorities must do more than merely have 
the opportunity to influence voting.
93
 
Crossover districts may even provide a more desirable remedy for Section 2 
violations than majority-minority districts, because crossover districts encourage 
majority and minority cooperation in the electoral process.
94
  In order to prove a 
crossover district’s success, plaintiffs need only show that “minority cohesion and 
turnout, as well as White ‘crossover’ voting, are sufficiently high enough to 
enable minorities to elect candidates of their choice.”95  Such an analysis is not an 
act of judicial divination; rather, it employs a mathematical calculation taken from 
verifiable percentages.  In fact, because Gingles II (political cohesion) and III 
                                                                                                                                     
(Minority Turnout = 30% and Anglo Turnout = 30%) 
Percent Minority Voters = 40x.30/(40x.30+60x.30) = 40% 
1. Minority Vote for 
Minority Candidate 
= .90 x 
40% 
= 36.0% 
[FNa1]
 
2. Anglo Vote for Minority 
Candidate 
= .25 x 
60% 
= 15.0% 
[FNaa1]
 
3. Total Vote for Minority 
Candidate 
= 36.0% + 
15.0% 
= 51.0% 
FNa1. The minority vote for the minority candidate is the product of minority cohesion (70% in 
District 1 and 90% in District 2) and the percent minority among voters. 
FNaa1. The white vote for the minority candidate is the product of white crossover voting (20% in 
District 1 and 25% in District 2) and the percent white among voters. 
91
 Id.  
92
 Id. at 17.     
93
 Id.  
94
 Id.  
95
 Id.   
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(consistent proof of majority bloc voting) are pre-conditions, courts will already 
have the numbers necessary to calculate the minority cohesion and white 
crossover votes. 
B.   The United States Census 
The Constitution mandates that a decennial population count be taken for 
the purpose of apportioning state delegates in the United States House of 
Representatives.
96
  The process used to carry out this requirement is the United 
States Census.  Apportionment is the use of the Census data to determine the 
number of representative seats that each state is entitled to hold in the House of 
Representatives.
97
  Redistricting is the use of the decennial survey returns to 
determine which state representatives (city council members, school board 
members, and federal and state legislators) represent which districts of the state 
and who votes in those districts.
98
  Redistricting based on the Census data 
determines where to draw the lines of those districts.
99
 
Prior to 2010, the Census used two forms to estimate the population of the 
United States: the “short form” and the “long form.”100  Beginning in March of 
the census year, the Census Bureau would mail the short form to every home in 
the population.
101
 This form would ask ten questions, such as the number of 
                                                 
96 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several States 
. . . . The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first meeting of the 
Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years in such Manner as 
they shall by Law direct.”). 
97 
District Decisions, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, (2010), available at http://www.census. 
gov/dmd/www/pdf/912ch4.pdf. States can gain or lose seats in the House depending on the 
fluctuation in their populations.  Id. 
98 
Id.   
99 
Some states allow redistricting at any time, while others can only redraw district boundaries 
once every ten years, after the Census.  See id. 
100 
United States Census 2000 Informational Copy, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/d-61b.pdf. 
101
 See UNITED STATES CENSUS 2010, http://2010.census.gov/2010census/ take10map/ (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2011).  72% of the Census forms sent through the mail were returned. Id.  Census workers 
hand deliver approximately 9% of the census forms to areas without street numbers or extremely 
rural communities.  See also 120 Million Households to Begin Receiving 2010 Census Advance 
2012]                                      THE MURKY MISINTERPRETATION OF THE VRA                                        137 
  
 
residents, length of residency, and ownership status of each home, as well as age, 
race, ethnicity, or gender.
102
  The long form only went to approximately one in six 
households and asked more in-depth questions regarding social and economic 
characteristics, housing status, and citizenship status.
103
  Essentially, the short 
form provided the population count, and the long form implicated the socio-
economic make-up of the population. The short-form Census does not ask 
questions regarding citizenship, as it counts both citizens and non-citizens alike 
residing within the United States;
104
 however, it still has a substantial effect on 
redistricting. 
The described Census data is the pulse of the redistricting and 
apportionment process.  Because a state’s population can change drastically in ten 
years, the updated Census count provides legislatures an opportunity to 
manipulate district boundaries to their political advantage, a process called 
gerrymandering.
105
  The release of the 2008 Census population report makes it 
clear that certain states will gain seats in the House of Representatives due to 
population increases; those states must, in turn, fill their new vacancies by voting 
for new representatives.
106
  The political party that has a majority in the state will 
                                                                                                                                     
Letter, UNITED STATES CENSUS 2010, Mar. 8, 2010, 
http://2010.census.gov/news/releases/operations/120-million-households-to-receive-advance-
letter.html. Census workers also personally visit trailer parks, homeless shelters, nursing homes, 
and prisons in order to get an accurate count of homeless, transient persons, and migrant workers. 
See UNITED STATES CENSUS 2010, http://2010.census.gov/2010census/take10map/ (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2011). 
102
 See UNITED STATES CENSUS 2010, 2010 Census Constituent Facts 1, 2, http://2010.census.gov/ 
partners/pdf/ConstituentFAQ.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2011). 
103
 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 2000 CENSUS FORM 
1–40 (2000), http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/d02p.pdf.  The long form asked questions 
regarding income, employment, migration to and from other states, house value or rent amount, 
place of birth, ancestry, house structure, veteran status, disabilities, marital status, and education.  
Id.  
104
 UNITED STATES CENSUS 2010, The Whole Story, 
http://www.census.gov/population/apportionment/about/faq.html#Q8 (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) 
(stating that the Census does not differentiate between citizens and non-citizens). 
105 
See Mulroy, supra note 27, at 338.  This process is called “gerrymandering.”  Id.  
106 
See, e.g., ELECTION DATA SERVICES, New Population Estimates Show Slight Changes For 2008 
Congressional Apportionment, But Point to Major Changes for 2010 (2008), 
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often re-draw district lines to favor its own party so that it may fill the additional 
House seats.  For example, if a state with a Republican majority gains seats in the 
House, the state’s legislature will likely draw the new district lines in a manner 
favorable to Republican voters to ensure that the winner of the vacancy is a 
Republican.
107
  This practice would also hold true in states that lose seats in the 
House of Representatives due to a population decrease.
108
  In such a case, the 
Republican majority can draw districts that benefit its own political agenda.  The 
VRA’s primary purpose is to protect the minority vote when these districts are re-
drawn, not to allow state legislatures to manipulate the drawing of districts for 
their own benefit. 
1.  Changes to the 2010 Census 
The Census Bureau conducted the twenty-third Census in 2010 with 
several notable departures from the previous process.  Although the Census 
Bureau continued to mail a short form to households and send Census workers to 
locations not accessible to the U.S. Postal Service, it discontinued the “long form” 
and instituted the American Community Survey (“ACS”).109  Unlike the decennial 
long form, the ACS is a continuous survey sent to approximately 250,000 
households per month.
110
 While the Census Bureau mailed the previous long form 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.electiondataservices.com/images/File/NR_Appor08wTables.pdf (noting that Texas, 
Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Nevada, South Carolina, and Utah are likely to gain seats in the House, 
while Ohio, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, 
New York, and Pennsylvania are likely to lose seats in the House following the 2010 Census.).  
107 
See Mulroy, supra note 27, at 338. This is similar to the situation that took place in California 
in 2000.  California’s population had increased so that it gained a seat in the House and 
Democrats, who maintained a majority in the state legislature, wanted to redraw district lines in 
their favor.  See also LEVITT, supra note 40, at 10.  
108 
See LEVITT, supra note 40, at 11.  In 2000 New York Democrats redrew a district to prevent a 
Democrat from challenging the incumbent Democrat in the primary for the state legislative seat.  
Id.   
109 
See Census 2010 News, UNITED STATES CENSUS 2010, http://2010.census.gov/news/press-
kits/one-year-out/about-one-year-out/potential-stories.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (stating the 
ACS was created in 2005 and provides current social and economic estimates for the population). 
110
 A Compass for Understanding and Using American Community Survey Data: What State and 
Local Governments Need to Know, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2 (2009), 
http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/handbooks/ACSstateLocal.pdf. 
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to approximately seventeen percent of the national population every ten years, it 
sends the new ACS to approximately 2.5 percent of the population annually.
111
   
The ACS and the decennial long-form differ in both the amount and type 
of data available.
112
 The ACS is not yet able to provide detailed annual 
information for less populated areas, particularly those under 20,000 people. The 
long-form, in contrast, was capable of producing this data.
113
  The ACS tables 
also provide Margin of Error measures (“MOE”), which highlight the potential 
inaccuracy of the ACS’s smaller sampling size.114  Indeed, the Bureau has 
suppressed information for many less-densely populated areas of the country 
because of insufficient sample size.
115
  On the other hand, the long form accessed 
and more accurately surveyed a much smaller sampling area.
116
  The main benefit 
of the ACS is its more recent data for more populated areas, giving legislators and 
communities a current idea of socio-economic conditions.  Thus, this aspect of the 
ACS may lead to more accurately drawn districts if legislatures use the proper 
redistricting standard.
117
  However, because the ACS conforms to the Census 
Bureau’s “official population estimates,” it is likely that inaccurate estimates used 
                                                 
111
 Glenn D. Magpantay & Nancy W. Yu, Asian Americans and Reauthorization of the Voting 
Rights Act, 19 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 30 (2005).  The ACS samples approximately 1 in 1,000 
households. Benavidez v. City of Irving, 638 F. Supp. 2d 709, 715 (N.D. Tex. 2009). 
112
 John Blodgett, American Community Service vs. Decennial Census: Are We Better Off Now 
Than We Were a Decade Ago?, OFFICE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DATA ANALYSIS (OSEDA), 
MO. CENSUS DATA CENTER (June 2009), 
http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/pub/data/acs/acsVScensus.shtml. 
113
 Id.  (“The single-year data are available for the 7,199 geographic areas with populations of at 
least 65,000 while the 3-year period estimates are available for about twice as many areas—those 
that meet the 20,000 population threshold”). 
114
 Id.    
115
 Id.  Data for these smaller areas should be available every five years, meaning it should be 
published in late 2010 or early 2011.  Id.  Although, many experts argue that the benefits of the 
ACS data far outweigh negative aspects, the long form was better suited to smaller populations 
whereas the ACS numbers for small areas will always be “fuzzy.”  Id. 
116
 Id.   
117
 Id.; see infra Part IV. 
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in the past will remain in the ACS data.
118
  The ACS is a recent sampling method 
and it will take an adjustment period to see if it is a truly beneficial method for the 
Census Bureau. 
2.   What Do the Census Changes Mean For the Future of Section Two 
Claims? 
Although the discontinuation of the long-form may not have a direct 
impact on redistricting and the VRA, it does have the potential to change the way 
Section 2 plaintiffs can bring their claims.  Under the old system, legislatures used 
the short form for redistricting the population, and the long form provided 
detailed socio-economic data that was used to allocate resources to areas of low 
income or provide bilingual services to areas with a large language minority.
119
    
The ACS’s inability to generate an adequate sample size for less populated 
areas will minimize representation for less-heavily populated rural areas.  Due to 
the long-form providing socio-economic data once every decade, the sample size 
was smaller, and the time between surveys provided an accurate “snap shot” of 
each area of the country that the ACS data will minimize.
120
 Ultimately, 
determining whether minorities constitute fifty percent of the population in a 
district requires reliance on the most recent Census data, which is notorious for 
undercounting minority populations in its estimates.
121
  The implementation of the 
ACS data coupled with Bartlett’s fifty percent standard “gives undue weight to 
Census results that are but a snapshot in time (invariably outdated by the time 
                                                 
118
 Blodgett, supra note 112 (stating that the ACS form has not revamped the way the Census 
estimates populations and therefore it is probable that the old underestimates will be transferred to 
the ACS).  
119
 Glenn D. Magpantay,  Asian American Voting Rights and Representation: A Perspective From 
the Northeast, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 739, 741 (2001). 
 
120 
See supra notes 113–118 and accompanying text. 
121
 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS 32, 33 (Barry Edmonston 
& Charles Schultze eds., 1995) (noting that the 1990 census failed to count 5.7% of blacks, while 
it missed only 1.3% of whites); Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 5 (1996) (“There 
have been twenty decennial censuses in the history of the United States. Although each was 
designed with the goal of accomplishing an "actual Enumeration’ of the population, no census is 
recognized as having been wholly successful in achieving that goal"). 
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litigation is completed) and are infected by the now well-established 
undercounting of minority peoples.”122  
Another notable aspect of the 2010 Census is the continued use of racial 
self-classification category.  In 2000, the Census short-form provided a multi-
racial option, allowing individuals to check more than one race for the first time 
in census history.
123
   Multiracial individuals may choose from 126 racial and 
ethnic combinations when self-classifying.
124
  Respondents may also write in their 
own racial or ethnic classification, such as “South African,” or “Muslim.”  The 
Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) and federal agencies use this data 
for civil rights enforcement.
125
   Under these guidelines, the Bureau essentially re-
classifies individuals that “self-classify” themselves as belonging to more than 
one race as consistently as possible for the purposes of the Census count.
126
  
Under these guidelines, an individual that, for example, checks both White and a 
                                                 
122
 See Lichtman & Hebert, supra note 88, at 18–19.  Relying on plaintiffs to prove the 
effectiveness of crossover districts will vary from district to district, but will not require the use of 
a threshold standard.  Id.  
123 
Nathaniel Persily, Color by Numbers: Race, Redistricting, and the 2000 Census, 85 MINN. L. 
REV. 899, 926–27 (2000). The 2010 Census allowed individuals to choose from 1) White, 2) 
Black, African-American or Negro, 3) American Indian or Alaska Native 4) Asian Indian, 
Japanese, Native Hawaiian, 5) Chinese, Korean, Guamanian or Chamorro, 6) Filipino, 
Vietnamese, or Samoan, or 7) some other race.  Id. 
124
 Manav Bhatnagar, Identifying the Identified: The Census, Race, and the Myth of Self-
Classification, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 85, 106 (2007).  
125
 Persily, supra note 123, at 930 (explaining that the OMB analyzes the 2000 racial classification 
data according to the “one-drop rule”. In other words, an individual that checks “White” and a 
minority race is allocated to the minority race); see also Bhatnagar, supra note 124, at 107 (stating 
that the OMB:  
[E]xplicitly requires respondents identifying as both white and a minority race to 
be allocated to the minority race category for tabulation purposes. Thus, an 
individual with one white and one black parent, who strongly identifies as either 
a mixed-race or white person, will be automatically tabulated and classified as 
black by federal agencies using that data. 
Id.  
126
 See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Executive Office of the President, Bull. No. 00-02, Guidance 
on Aggregation and Allocation of Data on Race for Use in Civil Rights Monitoring and 
Enforcement, (2000), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/bulletins_b00-02.  
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minority race will be allocated to the minority race when the information is used 
by federal agencies, while an individual who selects two races, neither of which is 
white, will not be reassigned or tabulated as one race or another.
127
  However, the 
OMB guidelines are silent as to how to classify responses with no clear racial 
meaning or those listing only an ethnicity.
128
  The presumption is that, for these 
responses, the Census Bureau arbitrarily decides what category the respondent 
should be placed in, as it did prior to the 2000 Census.
129
   
The reclassification may, however, prove inconsistent with individuals’ 
desired identifications for districting purposes.
130
  This process may undermine 
voter cohesion when, for example, minorities have checked more than one box 
and are allocated to the minority classification, but perhaps vote with white bloc 
voters at the polls.  This inflates minority population numbers, but actually dilutes 
minority cohesion at the polls.  Recall that Section 2 plaintiffs must demonstrate 
the Gingles factors using this Census race data, as well as election returns, to 
show that they have a valid claim for vote dilution.
131
  More racial categories on 
the Census will decrease the minority percentage of the community, making it 
more difficult for plaintiffs to constitute a compact and cohesive fifty percent 
minority-majority voting population under Bartlett.
132
 The separate race 
categories will also make it more difficult for Section 2 plaintiffs to prove racially 
polarized voting if they check multiple boxes due to the increase in racial 
categorization.
133
   
                                                 
127
 Id.  
128
 See Bhatnagar, supra note 124, at 107. 
129 
Id.  Additionally, many Census field workers may gather classification information from third-
parties such as neighbors or hospital records, meaning the classification is not authorized by the 
individual being classified. See Bhatnagar, supra note 124, at 109 (summarizing the administrative 
limits on self-identification). 
130
 See generally Bhatnagar, supra note 124. 
131 
See supra Part II, Section B.  
132 
See MIXED RACE IN AMERICA AND THE LAW: A READER 219 (Kevin R. Johnson ed., NYU 
Press 2003) (“[A] minority group would be left without a Section 2 claim unless the court agrees 
that the minority plus the multiracial group should be the relevant ‘racial group’ for bloc voting 
purposes (which would be the natural consequence of following the OMB guidelines)”). 
133
 Persily, supra note 123, at 936. 
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For example, imagine that the voting-age population in a district is 
composed of fifty percent Hispanic voters and fifty percent White voters.  If ten 
percent of the Hispanic voters have also marked a second or third category for 
another race on their Census forms, do they constitute a majority-minority district 
under Section 2, or are they, in effect, a crossover district which does not have 
Section 2 protection?  According to the OMB guidelines, the answer will depend 
on the nature of the enforcement agency analyzing the data.  It appears that if an 
individual checks more than one minority race, a federal agency will likely 
allocate such minorities to the classification of the minority that brings a 
complaint or alleges discrimination before the federal agency.
134
  However, this 
treatment is by no means a solidified rule as of yet.  Those minorities hovering 
under the fifty percent threshold may find the multi-racial option to be another 
obstacle to reaching a majority.  The Bartlett plurality holding only compounds 
these uncertainties by precluding crossover districts as remedies. In this case 
racial classification would be less important. 
IV. IS IT TIME FOR A NEW REDISTRICTING STANDARD? 
Redistricting is an important, and sometimes misleading aspect of the 
electoral process.  Congress has enacted statutory limitations on redistricting 
power, such as the VRA, to ensure that legislatures are fair to minority groups that 
have historically been precluded from participating in the democratic process.  
The limitations Congress has dictated must be clear and applicable for minorities 
to have a remedy available when those in power infringe upon their rights.  
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of the VRA and the 
inconsistency of Census data have diminished minority voters’ voices when the 
districts are redrawn.  This section examines the varied standards for redistricting 
that currently exist, and suggests that utilizing an area’s citizen voting-eligible 
population (“CVEP”) is the best remedy for both legislatures and minorities.  
 
 
                                                 
134
 See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Executive Office of the President, Bull. No. 00-02, Guidance 
on Aggregation and Allocation of Data on Race for Use in Civil Rights Monitoring and 
Enforcement, (2000), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/bulletins_b00-02. 
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A. What is the Current Redistricting Standard? 
The method of redistricting has enormous implications. The Bartlett Court 
created a bright-line numerosity requirement of fifty percent, but failed to 
articulate which portion of the population must be evaluated to find this 
percentage.
135
  Currently figures used in apportionment include total population, 
voting-age population (“VAP”), and citizen voting-age population (“CVAP”) 
numbers, but it is unclear as to which of these present the best option.
136
  Total 
population is the most common redistricting formula and it incorporates all 
individuals in an area, including children, in a redistricting plan.  Using CVAP, 
legislatures creating districts only count adult citizens of voting age according to 
the most recent population data (the ACS or the most recent Census).
137
   
Although total population may be the most easily calculable statistic, the 
Supreme Court has at least acknowledged that other redistricting formulas may 
better benefit the entire state.
138
  The Court indicated that voting-age population 
or eligible voter population might be a viable basis for apportionment and 
redistricting.
139
  The Court has further confused the issue by denying that it ever 
                                                 
135 
Luke P. McLoughlin, Note, Gingles in Limbo: Coalitional Districts, Party Primaries and 
Manageable Vote Dilution Claims, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 312, 323–24 (2005).  Bartlett v. Strickland 
seems to suggest that VAP is the proper standard for a VRA claim, but this is not entirely clear.  
See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 19. 
136
 See Dennis J. Murphy, Comment, Garza v. County of Los Angeles: The Dilemma over Using 
Elector Population as Opposed to Total Population in Legislative Apportionment, 41 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1013, 1013 (1991) (discussing the unresolved nature of the Supreme Court 
apportionment cases in determining which population count to use in the apportionment and 
redistricting process). 
137
 See generally Leo F. Estrada, Making the Voting Rights Act Relevant to the New Demographics 
of America: A Response to Farrell and Johnson, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1283, 1292 (2001) (explaining 
the different population formulas and how they evaluate areas of the population for redistricting).  
The author also explains voting-age population (VAP) is less common but includes all adults 
(citizens and non-citizens) of voting age in the district.  Id.  Bartlett v. Strickland held that 
minorities must make up fifty percent or more of the voting-age population (VAP) in order to 
bring a Section 2 claim.  See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 19. 
138 
See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91 (1966) (noting the Court does not require states to use 
total population as the method by which voting strength is measured). 
139
 See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530 (1969). Although the Court did not decide the 
issue of whether voting age or voting eligible population may be used instead of total population, 
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suggested that, “the States [must] include aliens, transients, short-term or 
temporary residents, or persons denied the vote for conviction of crime, in the 
apportionment base by which their legislators are distributed.”140   
The lower courts have adhered to this approach, and have already shown 
disagreement over which method to utilize.  In Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 
the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s utilization of the total population 
remedial criterion, but also recognized that it may not be the best method for areas 
that have a low number of voting age citizens because it is not an accurate gauge 
of voting strength in the district.
 141
 
The aforementioned methods are not without their respective problems 
and difficulties.  VAP and CVAP may produce inaccurate measures of a district’s 
voters and are, therefore, an improper basis for remedial districts.  VAP does not 
differentiate between citizens and non-citizens and may inflate the population, 
whereas CVAP does differentiate between citizens and non-citizens, but may 
adversely affect non-citizen populations among Latinos and Asians.
142
  CVAP is 
also problematically dependent on Census data, which neither differentiates 
between citizens and non-citizens
143
 nor provides information for the years 
between the decennial count.
144
  However, this may become less of a current 
                                                                                                                                     
it “assume[ed] without deciding that apportionment may be based on eligible voter population 
rather than total population.” Id. 
140 
Burns, 384 U.S. at 92.  
141
 Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 773 (1990).  In this case, the plaintiffs 
established liability but disagreed as to the remedial district and how to draw it.  Murphy, supra 
note 136, at 1013.  In order to establish liability in a Section 2 claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate 
liability in the “liability stage” and show that a remedy is available in the “remedy stage,” and 
submit it to the district court to create a remedial plan. See supra Part II, Section B.   
142
 See Estrada, supra note 137, at 1294.  Estrada provides the method for calculating CVAP for 
Hispanic voters. Id.  CVAP is calculated by dividing the number of eligible citizens into the 
number of Spanish surnamed voters. Spanish surnamed voters are determined by matching a list of 
the most common Spanish surnames against the voter registration list. Unlike the information on 
citizenship, Spanish surname voter registration can be updated during the decade.  Id. at n.51. 
143
 Id. at 1294.  
144
 Id. at 1295.  
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concern because the annual ACS supplements the Census data for most districts 
nationwide.
145
 
B.  Citizen Voting Eligible Population (“CVEP”) 
Citizen voting-eligible population (“CVEP”) is the best method district 
courts and Section 2 plaintiffs can use when creating remedial districts.
146
  The 
CVEP is essentially an adjusted version of the CVAP.  Utilized most often in 
voter-turnout calculations, CVEP includes all citizens of voting age in a district 
that are actually eligible to vote. CVEP therefore excludes non-citizens or 
disenfranchised felons, unlike other, inaccurate methods previously discussed.
147
  
To calculate and remove non-citizens, legislatures must use the most recent 
Census data, Current Population Survey (“CPS”),148 and the ACS to adjust the 
VAP of an area.
149
  The percentage of non-citizens derives from dividing the total 
number of non-citizens according to the CPS by the best VAP estimate.
150
  The 
number of disenfranchised felons is then calculated according to Department of 
Justice Reports and applicable state law.
151
  The Department of Justice Bureau, 
                                                 
145
 See supra Part III, Section B.1 (asserting that ACS is not yet able to provide detailed annual 
information for less populated areas). 
146 The author has taken Dr. Michael McDonald’s work using CVEP to calculate accurate voter 
turnout and will apply it to the redistricting process. See generally Dr. Michael McDonald, The 
United States Election Project, http://elections.gmu.edu/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2011). 
147
 The disenfranchisement of felons and the mentally incompetent depends on state law.  See Dr. 
Michael McDonald, Voter Turnout Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://elections.gmu.edu/FAQ.html#VEP? (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).  Voter turnout includes 
eligible overseas voters for national votes (the presidential election), but it is not presently possible 
to allocate overseas voters to their particular states.  Id. 
148
 Id.  CPS data is available on the Census Bureau website and includes the estimated number of 
non-citizens in different geographic areas.  Id.  The CPS non-citizen count is a non-institutional 
population count, meaning that non-citizens residing in nursing homes, prisons, dormitories, and 
the like are not counted in CPS.  Id.  However, Dr. McDonald explains that he uses a different 
method to count disenfranchised felons so the CVEP non-citizen estimate does not count non-
citizen prisoners twice.  Id. 
149
 Id.  
150
 Id.  
151
 Id.  Because the voting eligibility of felons depends on state law, McDonald must estimate state 
by state.  Id.  “Statistics drawn from various Department of Justice reports which detail the prison, 
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Office of Justice Statistics releases the estimated numbers of felons for each state 
from January 1st through December 31st each year.
152
  Using the applicable state 
law, the CVEP formula estimates the number of felons who have been stripped of 
the right to vote and subtracts them from CVAP.
153
  Without the excess padding 
provided by added felons and non-citizens, states can derive a far more accurate 
estimate of a minority group’s opportunity to elect with CVEP. 
C.  Will CVEP Correct the Problem? 
States need a standard that will count their voting populations accurately 
during the remedy phase.  For redistricting purposes, it is a person’s vote, rather 
than presence, that will make a difference in the electoral process.  The national 
population standard is the broadest population count and the easiest for states to 
obtain; however, it overestimates the number of voters.  VAP is similarly broad 
but excludes minors.  CVAP eliminates non-citizens from the population count, 
but fails to eliminate disenfranchised felons.  CVEP, therefore, is the narrowest 
and most accurate population count of eligible voters available. It would allow 
states to count only those residents within its borders that are both citizens of 
voting age and are eligible to vote.  In Burns v. Richardson, the Supreme Court 
seemed to condone the use of CVEP in apportionment and redistricting, 
concluding that legislatures should not include aliens, transient residents, or 
disenfranchised felons in their redistricting formulas.
154
   
                                                                                                                                     
probation, and parole population of the United States are matched with these state laws to estimate 
the number of ineligible felons.”  Id.   
152
 Id.  
153
 Id. For the United States totals, individuals in the Federal Corrections System are also included. 
Id. While Dr. McDonald’s formula is helpful in constructing the national numbers of those eligible 
to vote and a better CVEP for states, there is currently no available method to count which 
residents residing overseas vote from which states. Id.
 
154
 Burns, 384 U.S. at 92 (1966).  The Court stated:  
Neither in Reynolds v. Sims nor in any other decision has this Court suggested 
that the States are required to include aliens, transients, short-term or temporary 
residents, or persons denied the vote for conviction of crime, in the 
apportionment base by which their legislators are distributed and against which 
compliance with the Equal Protection Clause is to be measured.   
Id. (referring to Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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The Census currently counts prisoners in the area where they are 
imprisoned and not the area they lived in prior to incarceration.  This can inflate 
the population for districts containing a prison within its borders and makes it 
appear that the district has more voters than it actually does.  CVEP data would 
eliminate the misleading information and provide legislatures with an accurate 
conception of minorities’ opportunity to elect representatives of their choice.   
While CVEP has a measurable effect on the creation of illustrative 
districts for Section 2 plaintiffs in the remedy phase, CVEP may not benefit 
plaintiffs in the liability phase because plaintiffs now must meet the numerosity 
requirement of Bartlett.  Traditionally, illustrative districts must show that it was 
possible to draw a geographically compact district in which the minority group 
makes up a majority of the district in satisfaction of Gingles I and Bartlett.
155
  An 
illustrative district plan must have districts of equal total population,
156
 or if the 
area is a municipality, the population should not deviate from the other districts 
by more than ten percent.
157
  The districts must also comply with the Equal 
Protection Clause and coincide with existing official political and informal 
geographic boundaries, such as city or county lines or around communities.
158
   
These limits, coupled with Bartlett’s bright-line fifty-percent rule cause 
CVEP’s celebrated precision to lose its luster.  Minority plaintiffs seeking to 
prove that they can constitute fifty percent or more of an illustrative district may 
find it easier to use VAP, total population, or even CVAP to draw illustrative 
districts because these population counts provide numbers closer to fifty-percent 
in districts where CVEP may limit the pool of voting minorities.
 159
  However, 
broader population counts, such as total population, include minors and non-
resident aliens even though they are not eligible to vote.
160
 
                                                 
155
 See, e.g., Benavidez, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 714 (N.D. Tex. 2009). 
156
 See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 24 (1976).  
157
 See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–43 (1983). 
158
 See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). 
159 
See supra Part III, Section A.  
160 
See Garza, 918 F.2d at 775 (1990). The court stated: 
Non-citizens are entitled to various federal and local benefits, such as 
emergency medical care and pregnancy-related care provided by Los Angeles 
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Ultimately, CVEP will benefit Section 2 plaintiffs at the remedy phase 
when the district court orders a new district drawn in response to Section 2 
liability.  After liability is established, the court wipes the legislature’s slate clean 
and the legislature has an opportunity to remedy the vote dilution of its previously 
drawn district.  The implementation of CVEP would be superior at the remedy 
phase for all parties involved.  It will require states to create fair districts without 
superfluous voters, and it will provide an accurate count of minorities with one 
vote for every eligible person in the district rather than one vote for every existing 
person in the district.   
V. CONCLUSION 
The Voting Rights Act, arguably the most beneficial legislative action for 
minorities since the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, is still struggling to 
fulfill its purpose.  The recent Supreme Court decision in Bartlett v. Strickland 
has reinterpreted Section 2 of the VRA to make it more difficult for minority 
plaintiffs to bring claims.  This holding, combined with the changes to the 2010 
Census, works against minority plaintiffs and causes confusion in the application 
of Section 2.  Today, there are more questions than there are answers, and the 
VRA is in desperate need of Congressional clarification.  Crossover districts 
should be allowed as a Section 2 remedy so that minority plaintiffs have a genuine 
chance for electoral success, even when they inhabit districts in smaller numbers.  
However, until crossover districts are allowed as a remedy, plaintiffs should be 
entitled to choose the most beneficial population count method to meet the 
Gingles requirements.   
With the implementation of a bright-line fifty percent “numerosity” 
requirement, it has become even more important to apply a redistricting method 
that will fairly and adequately count minorities and allow those individuals a fair 
chance to exercise their voting rights.  CVEP should be used as a proper 
redistricting method for calculating minority opportunity to elect. Total 
                                                                                                                                     
County. As such, they have a right to petition their government for services and 
to influence how their tax dollars are spent. In this case, basing districts on 
voting population rather than total population would disproportionately affect 
these rights for people living in the Hispanic district. Such a plan would dilute 
the access of voting age citizens in that district to their representative, and would 
similarly abridge the right of aliens and minors to petition that representative. 
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population, VAP, or CVAP, alternatively, could be implemented in the liability 
phase in order to reach the fifty percent threshold.  Neither of these options, 
however, can occur until Congress clarifies the correct interpretation of Section 2 
and provides courts and individuals with a flexible and workable standard for 
redistricting.  As Justice Ginsburg stated in her dissent, the Bartlett decision 
“returns the ball to Congress’ court” and challenges the Legislature “to clarify 
beyond debate the appropriate reading of § 2.”161  This article implores Congress 
to accept this challenge and bring its policies within the aims of the VRA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
161 
Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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